BEYOND TEN IN TEN: COMMAND AND CONTROL OF FOLLOW-ON U.S. DIVISIONS TO AFCENT

A Monograph

by

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This monograph discusses command and control arrangements for U.S. divisions deployed to AFCENT after the initial rapid reinforcement, the so-called "ten in ten" requirement. Specifically, the paper addresses the type of headquarters needed and whether it should be forward-deployed or CONUS-based.

The monograph first examines the operational level of war in theory and doctrine, in order to determine the level at which the headquarters should operate. NATO command and control structure is then examined to see where such a headquarters must interface with existing headquarters. A "strawman" deployment scenario is developed to show at what point in the development sequence such a headquarters is needed. Historical cases which illustrate the role of corps in major operations are cited.

Finally, conclusions and a recommendation as to the type and number of headquarters, basing mode, and sequence of deployment are made. The monograph finds the corps headquarters most appropriate, but recommends decisions (continued on other side of form)

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

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

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

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ABSTRACT

BEYOND TEN IN TEN: COMMAND AND CONTROL OF FOLLOW-ON U.S. DIVISIONS TO AFCENT by MAJ James F. Wolf, USA, 42 pages.

This monograph discusses command and control arrangements for U.S. divisions deployed to AFCENT after the initial rapid reinforcement, the so-called "ten in ten" requirement. Specifically, the paper addresses the type of headquarters needed and whether it should be forward-deployed or CONUS-based.

The monograph first examines the operational level of war in theory and doctrine, in order to determine the level at which the headquarters should operate. NATO command and control structure is then examined to see where such a headquarters must interface with existing headquarters. A "strawman" deployment scenario is developed to show at what point in the deployment sequence such a headquarters is needed. Historical cases which illustrate the role of corps in major operations are cited.

Finally, conclusions and a recommendation as to the type and number of headquarters, basing mode, and sequence of deployment are made. The monograph finds corps headquarters most appropriate, but recommends decisions in this area be driven by campaign planning at the operational level, not by the number of divisions available.

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INTRODUCTION

This year, 1989, marks the fortieth anniversary of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, NATO, which provides the framework for the mutual defense of over 620 million people in Western Europe and North America. 1 Today the alliance pursues the twin strategies of defense and deterrence, combined with a quest for arms control/reduction and improved relations with the East block nations. 2

For the United States of America, NATO remains an important element of national defense strategy. Within the NATO strategy of flexible response, the U.S. has demonstrated its resolve through the forward deployment of substantial conventional and theater nuclear forces. The U.S. has further committed to the rapid reinforcement of NATO, pledging to make available ten Army divisions, a Marine Expeditionary Force, and eighty-eight United States Air Force squadrons within ten days of mobilization. 3 This is the so-called "ten in ten" requirement.

The past decade was one of significant doctrinal change for U.S. Army forces, both those forward deployed in NATO and those with a NATO reinforcement mission. While U.S. and NATO strategies have remained fairly constant, U.S. Army doctrine has not. Doctrinally, the implementation of AirLand Battle and the recognition of the operational level of war, beginning with the 1982 version of Field Manual (FM) 100-5, Operations, have re-focused Army leaders on considerations for conducting campaigns and major operations. These considerations are

apparent in the current version of FM 100-5, published in 1986, as well as FM 100-6, Large Unit Operations, and FM 100-15, Corps Operations. Furthermore, allied publications, such as the Operational Guideline, published by the German Army, reflect the same interest. 4

The focus of this paper is command and control of those U.S. Army divisions committed to NATO's Allied Forces Central Europe (AFCENT) after the initial "ten in ten" rapid reinforcement. Specifically, the paper will address the type of headquarters needed, whether it should be forward deployed or CONUS (Continental United States) based, or a combination of the two. Moreover, the manner in which such a headquarters lends itself to execution of AirLand Battle at the operational level of war, while complementing NATO's command and control structure, is addressed.

The methodology of this paper is to review the theory and doctrine impacting on the subject area, examine the command and control structure in NATO, establish a "strawman" deployment sequence for U.S. forces, determine appropriate missions for follow-on forces, and examine the possible structure of appropriate type headquarters. Historical cases are examined to determine the role of command and control headquarters in conducting major operations. Finally, conclusions and a recommendation as to the type and number of headquarters, basing mode, and sequence of deployment are made.

THE OPERATIONAL LEVEL OF WAR

FM 100-5, Operations, defines the structure of modern war as follows:

> War is a national undertaking which must be coordinated from the highest levels of policy making to the basic levels of execution. Military strategy, operational art, and tactics are the broad divisions of activity in preparing for and conducting war. Successful strategy achieves national and alliance political aims at the lowest possible cost in lives and treasure. Operational art translates those aims into effective military operations and campaigns. Sound tactics win the battles and engagements which produce successful campaigns and operations. 5

FM 100-5 goes on to further define operational art:

> Operational art is the employment of military forces to attain strategic goals in a theater of war or theater of operations through the design, organization, and conduct of campaigns and major operations. A campaign is a series of joint actions designed to attain a strategic objective in a theater of war. Simultaneous campaigns may take place when the theater of war contains more than one theater of operations....A major operation comprises the coordinated actions of large forces in a single phase of a campaign or in a critical battle. Major operations decide the course of campaigns. 6

Some commentators have observed that operational art as defined in FM 100-5 really consists of two levels. Robert M. Epstein, Ph.D., Professor of History at the U.S. Army's School of Advanced Military Studies, has noted:

> The operational level of war..., is given meaning by the strategic context. Here it involves the use of military forces in campaigns, major operations which historically was (sic) called battles, to achieve strategic objectives. Operational art is the means by which a favorable battle situation was created. The process of this creation of a favorable battle situation has in the past been referred to as military strategy and this forms the upper strata of the

> operational level. (emphasis added) The use of large combined arms formations in battles has in the past been referred to as grand tactics and forms the lower strata of operational art. (emphasis added) 7

James J. Schneider, well-known author on military theory and another member of the faculty at the U.S. Army's School of Advanced Military Studies, has noted a similar division of the operational level of war. In Schneider's model, operational art consists of an upper level corresponding to operational axis or army group and a lower level consistent with zone of operations or corps. 8

While Inspecteur des Heeres, General H. H. v. Sandrart, currently Commander AFCENT, stated that:

> Besides conducting the battle in accordance with the principle of tactics we must therefore conceive the operational command and control in its greater dimensions and interdependencies as a separate field of military command and control below the strategic level.
>
> The integrated command and control of land forces begins at the operational level of command; this is also where the interfaces between forces under national command and control are found. 9

Thus, we can see a general recognition of an operational level of war existing between strategy and tactics. We can further deduce that for the U.S. Army this level consists of two subsets: operational art at the upper level and major operations at the lower level. This is in fact stated in FM 100-6, Large Unit Operations. 10

FM 100-5 does not equate operational art or major operations with a specific level of command; rather, it relates conducting campaigns and major operations to theaters of operation.

> The principle task of theater commanders and their subordinate commanders is to concentrate superior strength against enemy vulnerabilities at the decisive time and place to achieve strategic and policy aims. The overall joint or allied commander in each theater of operations plans and executes campaigns and major operations ... 11
>
> Major operations are the coordinated elements of phases of a campaign. The success or failure of a major operation will have a decisive impact on the conduct of a particular phase of a campaign... In general, operational planning commits forces and support to corps and armies for an extended period. Commanders of corps and armies receive long-range objectives and great freedom in design of their own operations. 12

If operational art can be thought of in terms of a theater of operations, and major operations are elements of a theater campaign, what type of headquarters would normally be associated with each? This question becomes important as we look at the command and control structure within NATO in an effort to determine the command and control requirements for follow-on forces to AFCENT. FM 100-5 provides us with functional descriptions of higher headquarters from corps through theater army. In brief:

> Corps are the Army's largest tactical units, the instruments with which higher echelons of command conduct maneuver at the operational level....Corps plan and conduct major operations and battles....when employed alone, they may exercise operational as well as tactical responsibilities. 13

> Field armies may be formed by theater army commanders in coordination with the CINCs of unified command to control and direct the operations of assigned corps....Field armies exercise major operational responsibilities. Field armies and equivalent organizations are primary operational headquarters. 14

> In a mature theater of war where a large number of forces are employed, theater army commanders, in coordination with the CINCs of unified or combined commards, may form army groups to control the operations of two to five field armies....Army group commanders perform major missions for which they usually receive broad operational guidance. 15

> Theater army is normally the Army service component command in a unified command....The theater army as the service component has both operational and support responsibilities. Its exact tasks are assigned by the theater CINC and may be exclusively operational missions, solely logistic tasks, or a combination of both types of responsibility. 16

Thus, while FM 100-5 may not directly link levels of command with operational art, it would appear from the excerpts above that we can make some general conclusions as to which headquarters are more likely to be "operational" in a given theater. In a large theater such as the Central Region, theater army provides broad operational guidance to army groups, which in turn control the operations of field armies who are the "primary operational headquarters." Corps are the "instruments with which higher echelons of command conduct maneuver at the operational level." In the next section of this paper we will review NATO command and control structure in an attempt to determine where operational functions are performed.

In his Operational Guideline, General H. H. v. Sandrart provides a perspective on operational level headquarters from the perspective of the German Army in NATO. The operational levels of command are considered to be:

> Major Subordinate Commanders (MSC)
> CINCENT in Central Europe and/or CINCNORTH for the area of Schleswig-Holstein translates the strategic objectives of the Alliance into operational tasks assigned to land and air forces. 17
>
> Principal Subordinate Commanders (PSC)
> Army Groups, COMAAFCE, Allied Tactical Air Forces (ATAF). The overall responsibility for the planning and conduct of the joint land/air warfare lies with the army groups and ATAFs. 18
>
> Corps
> The national corps are the operational forces of the army group. They have to realize the operational objective of the army group. 19

We can see that General von Sandrart directly links operational art to specific levels of command. In his scheme, CINCENT and CINCNORTH translate strategy into operational tasks, army groups plan and conduct operations, and corps are the operational forces of the army groups.

The common denominators in both the German and American view would appear to be the army group and corps. In both cases, the army group has distinct operational responsibilities while the corps is the force which places the operational plan on the ground in battle. A graphic representation of this is shown on the following page.



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The graphic applies to actual arrangements in NATO. It helps us to see that the operational level of war is not clear-cut. In addition, it is apparent that the upper portion, operational art, is closely affiliated with army group and army, while the lower portion, major operations, is closely aligned with corps.

COMMAND AND CONTROL STRUCTURE IN NATO

The North Atlantic Treaty provides the framework for a military alliance primarily designed to prevent aggression, but also to repel it if it should occur. It is of indefinite duration and provides for continuous cooperation and consultation in political, economic, and other non-military areas. 21

NATO has both a civil and a military structure. The highest authority in NATO is the North Atlantic Council. This body provides the forum for political coordination and consultation between the members. Military policy is discussed in the Defense Planning Committee (DPC), one of the principal committees of the Council. The DPC is composed of those member countries which participate in NATO's integrated defense structure.

Twice annually, ministerial meetings are held in both the Council and DPC, where member countries are represented by their Foreign and Defense Ministers respectively. Permanent Representatives at the ambassador level meet in council session at least weekly.

The Secretary General of NATO is Chairman of the Council and the DPC. Additionally, he heads the International Staff. The Council and the DPC have established a number of subordinate committees which address the range of NATO activities. These meet under the chairmanship of a member of the International Staff.

The Military Committee, the senior military authority in the Alliance, consists of the Chiefs-of-Staff of the member countries participating in the NATO integrated military structure. The committee provides advice to the Council and the DPC relating to military matters. Additionally, the Military Committee gives guidance to the Major NATO Commanders.

The Committee meets weekly at the national military representative level and twice annually at the Chief-of-Staff level. Serving as the executive agency for the Committee is the International Military Staff (IMS), which ensures implementation of the Committee's policies and decisions.

NATO's defense area is divided into three regional commands; Allied Command Europe, Allied Command Atlantic, and Allied Command Channel. A regional planning group is established for the North American area. Major NATO Commanders are responsible for planning the defense of their areas and for conducting NATO exercises.

A schematic of NATO's civil and military structure is shown below.



For the purposes of this paper, I will address primarily command and control within the NATO regional command of Allied Command Europe (ACE) and its subordinate command, Allied Forces Central Europe (AFCENT). This command covers the geographical land area from North Cape to North Africa and from the Atlantic to the eastern border of Turkey, excluding the United Kingdom and Portugal. The commander of ACE is known as the Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR). 23

SACEUR is responsible for the defense against any attack of Allied countries within his area. In time of war, he would control all land, sea, and air operations in his area. However, coastal defense and internal defense remain national responsibilities. 24

SACEUR and his subordinate commanders only assume their full authority after transfer of operational command and/or control of forces to NATO by national governments. This process is known as TOA. In peacetime, only air defense forces, quick reaction alert forces, and the ACE Mobile Force are under SACEUR operational command. 25

SACEUR has the right to direct access to the Chiefs-of-Staff, Defense Ministers, and Heads of Government of any NATO powers. Additionally, except for France and Iceland, all NATO countries maintain a National Military Representative (NMR) at Supreme Headquarters, Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE). 26

Four Major Subordinate Commands (MSC) are directly responsible to SACEUR. These are the Northern European Command (Allied Forces Northern Europe -- AFNORTH), the Central

European Command (Allied Forces Central Europe -- AFCENT), the Southern
European Command (Allied Forces Southern Europe -- AFSOUTH), and the United Kingdom NATO Air Forces (UKAIR).

The MSC considered in this paper is AFCENT. The commander of AFCENT is known as Commander-in-Chief Allied Forces Central Europe or CINCENT. As of this writing, the CINCENT is General Hans-Henning von Sandrart of the Bundeswehr (German Army).

AFCENT has wartime operational command of two army groups: Northern Army Group (NORTHAG) and Central Army Group (CENTAG). Under NORTHAG, from north to south, are I Netherlands Corps, I German Corps, I British Corps, and I Belgium Corps. According to Isby and Kamps, upon mobilization and deployment from the United States, III U.S. Corps is employed in the NORTHAG area. Under CENTAG, from north to south, are III German Corps, V U.S. Corps, VII U.S. Corps, and II German Corps. 27 The 4th Canadian Mechanized Brigade Group (4 CMBG) is assigned to NATO with a role as CENTAG reserve. 28

Additionally, AFCENT has wartime operational control of Allied Air Forces Central Europe (AAFCE). AAFCE in turn would control two subordinate commands, 2 and 4 Allied Tactical Air Forces (ATAF). Under the ATAFs are the Allied Tactical Operations Centers (ATOC) and Sector Operations Centers (SOC), which provide tactical control of conventional air forces. Air Support Operations Centers (ASOC) are located with corps headquarters and provide the primary operational air-ground interface. 29

A joint AFCENT/AAFCE staff provides centralized air planning. AAFCE distributes resources between the two ATAFs, while retaining control of selected assets. ATAFs determine the number of sorties allocated to the various mission categories and designate offensive counter-air and interdiction targets. ATOCs assign missions to specific units and coordinate the sorties. ASOCs act as the interface between the ATOCs and the army corps headquarters. 30



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The final force which must be taken into account when discussing AFCENT is the French Army. The French are an exceptional case among the armies in the AFCENT area. France remains a member of the NATO alliance; however, her armed forces are not part of NATO's integrated military structure. Although France retains the right not to participate with NATO

in any future conflict, plans exist for such participation should it be necessary. 32

If we relate NATO's command and control structure to the previous section's discussion on the operational level of war, we may deduce which headquarters function at the operational level. SACEUR, as a theater of war commander, translates the Alliance's strategic and policy aims into military strategy.

The regional commanders, like Commander AFCENT, take the strategic guidance and translate it into broad operational guidance in the form of a campaign plan. They are the practitioners of operational art in NATO. This is analogous to the role of army groups as stated in FM 100-5.

The army groups, NORTHAG and CENTAG, conduct major operations within the campaign plan. The army group commanders function at the lower end of the operational level of war, major operations. Their role is analogous to that of field armies as stated in FM 100-5.

Corps are the tactical units with which the NATO Army Groups conduct maneuver at the operational level. Corps may conduct major operations themselves within the confines of the army group plan. This is in accordance with FM 100-5.

U.S. FORCE STRUCTURE AND REINFORCEMENT OF AFCENT

Any discussion of U.S. follow-on divisions to AFCENT must start with a review of U.S. force structure and stationing. This will allow us to determine the divisions which may be available for deployment after the "ten in ten" reinforcement. A review of current stationing of these divisions will allow assumptions to be made as to a reasonable deployment schedule and sequence. Forces available and the approximate time of their availability to AFCENT will allow us to better determine the appropriate type and location of a command and control headquarters for these forces.

Current U.S. Army force structure consists of twenty-eight divisions and thirty-two separate maneuver regiments and brigades. This count excludes special operations forces and aviation units. Eighteen of the divisions are active units, with a total of one airborne, one air assault, one motorized, one infantry, four light infantry, six mechanized infantry, and four armored. Of the ten National Guard divisions, one is light infantry, two are mechanized infantry, two are armored, and five are infantry. 33

Of the thirty-two separate maneuver brigades and regiments, eight are in the active force. One of these brigades is mechanized infantry, two are infantry, two are armored, and three regiments are armored cavalry. Twenty-one brigades are in the National Guard. Of these twenty-one brigades/regiments, two are armored, four are armored cavalry, six are mechanized infantry, and the remaining nine are

infantry. 34 Seven of these units round out or augment active duty divisions. 35 Three separate brigades are located in the U.S. Army Reserve. One of these is infantry and two are mechanized infantry. They have no round-out or augmentation missions. 36

Additionally, the U.S. Army has five active corps headquarters. Three are stationed in CONUS and two are forward deployed to Europe in the AFCENT area, under the Central Army Group. One corps headquarters, IX Corps (Reinforcement), is found in the reserves, stationed in Hawaii. 37

Active U.S. land and air forces currently deployed to Europe total slightly over 354,000 service members, of whom 27,200 are afloat (naval and marine). This figure is equal to approximately 65% of all personnel which the U.S. deploys overseas. Of these personnel, about 296,000 are deployed in the AFCENT region. Approximately 211,000 of these are Army, 77,000 Air Force, and 7,200 Navy. 38

The U.S. Army maintains the equivalent of more than five divisions in AFCENT. These units include 8th Infantry Division (Mech), 3rd Armored Division, 3rd Infantry Division (Mech), and 1st Armored Division. The first two of these fall under V (U.S.) Corps and the latter two under VII (U.S.) Corps. Additionally, V Corps has the 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment (ACR) and VII Corps has both the 2nd ACR and 1st Infantry Division (FWD) (one brigade). 39

Thus, to meet its reinforcement requirement for ten divisions within ten days of mobilization, the United States must deploy the equivalent of five divisions to AFCENT. The United States began preparing for the wartime reinforcement of Europe in 1962 with what is now known as POMCUS, Prepositioning Of Material Configured in Unit Sets. 40

The POMCUS concept assumes eight to twelve days of strategic warning. This would allow the CONUS-based units to alert, deploy (fly) to Germany, draw equipment, and be employed by the NATO command. 41 Six sets of equipment in various degrees of completeness are located in Germany, Belgium, and the Netherlands. The southern sets, one, two, and three, are traditionally associated with 1st Infantry Division, an ACR, two separate brigades, and one or two additional divisions. The three northern sets, four, five, and six, are thought to be for elements of III (U.S.) Corps; specifically, 1st Cavalry Division (Armored), 2nd Armored Division, and 4th Infantry Division (Mech). 42

The United States has eight fast roll-on/roll-off (RO/RO) transports. Five of them can carry a "heavy" (mechanized infantry or armored) division. Approximately one day is needed for loading, four days for cross-Atlantic transit at 33kt, and one day to unload, for a total of six days. Such ships would most likely transport divisions located near ports, such as the 5th or 24th Divisions. 43

In order to create a deployment sequence scenario "strawman", we must make some assumptions on warning times and political reactions to a perceived threat. For the purpose of this paper we will not consider a "bolt from the blue" attack with no warning. We will also assume that no friction occurs in the political process; that is to say, no additional time will be factored in for the political decisions which must take place for mobilization.

After 40 years of development, NATO's alerting procedures do not have any supranational authority. Mobilization, like logistics, is a national responsibility. Each NATO country decides independently whether to alert and mobilize its national forces committed to NATO. 44

How much warning time does NATO need to get ready? Figures vary among sources. Isby and Kamps, in Armies of NATO's Central Front, state that 48 hours of intelligence lead time is the minimum necessary to react. 45

Cordesman, in NATO's Central Region Forces, states that NATO's own estimates are that it would take 96 hours (four days) for the 71 brigades in AFCENT to deploy to their defensive positions. Cordesman believes this figure to be optimistic as it fails to account for major national readiness and mobilization problems. He feels a more realistic time frame for the forward brigades is six to ten days, with ten additional days required to bring up the first twenty-six reserve brigades. He projects a total of thirty days for al

reserves to be in place and thirty to sixty days to properly deploy U.S. rapid reinforcements. 46

For the purposes of this paper, we will assume that NATO receives 48 hours intelligence lead time in addition to 96 hours to deploy the forward combat brigades. Thus, we assume six days total warning prior to attack. How does this affect U.S. deployment? That is the purpose of our "strawman".

Let us assume the decision is made immediately upon warning to deploy the rapid reinforcement units, the "ten in ten" force. I will consider this to be mobilization or "M" day in my "strawman"scenario. We can safely assume 24 hours or one day is spent in alerting units and recalling personnel. At least one additional day will be required to prepare "fly-in" personnel to deploy. This 48-hour period may be optimistic, but is reasonable. It also aligns well with the call-up of the Civil Reserve Air Fleet (CRAF).

The Secretary of Defense may declare an Airlift Emergency and call up 171 commercial aircraft to support deployment within 24 hours of their notification. If a State of National Emergency is declared by the President, the Secretary may call up an additional 268 aircraft to be available in 48 hours. 47

Enough aircraft will be available to transport the "fly-in" element over a two-day period in our "strawman' scenario. This has the last fly-in elements in Europe after four days, ready to begin drawing POMCUS. However, this still leaves elements of the force which must move non-POMCUS equipment such as helicopters and communications gear to aerial ports of

debarkation for movement to Europe. Additionally, some heavy non-POMCUS gear or units may need to move by ship.

We will assume that the ships (8 RO/RO) were made available in the same forty-eight hour period as the CRAF, as well as sufficient air-lifters to move high priority cargo. Given twenty-four hours to move to aerial ports and sea ports, these elements are only slightly behind the fly-in personnel.

Assuming forty-eight hours for the high priority air-lifted equipment to arrive, it should be in Europe one day after the fly-in element, or M+5 days. Six days are required to load, sail, and unload the ships. This brings the heavy equipment to Europe at M+7 days.

We will now assume forty-eight hours to link-up the various elements with their parent units and an additional twenty-four hours to move into reserve positions. This puts the rapid reinforcement units ready for employment at M+10 days, or four days after initiation of hostilities.

The rapid reinforcement scenario provided above is highly optimistic. Even if we add a factor of 50% for the "friction" bound to be involved in such an operation, we still have the units ready for employment at M+15 days, or nine days after the initiation of hostilities.

We will assume the fifteen day figure for our "strawman". Thus, nine days into the war we will assume the equivalent of ten U.S. divisions in AFCENT. We will designate these as consisting of three corps: III Corps, V Corps, and VII Corps. III Corps would consist of 1st Cavalry Division, 2nd Armored

Division, 4th Infantry Division (Mech), and an ACR. V Corps would be made up of 8th Infantry Division (Mech), 3rd Armored Division, and two separate brigades and an ACR. VII Corps would include 1st Infantry Division (Mech), 1st Armored Division, 3rd Infantry Division (Mech), and an ACR.

This deployment leaves two corps headquarters, one infantry division, two infantry divisions mechanized, four light divisions, a motorized division, an airborne division, and an air assault division of the active force. Of these, the infantry division in Korea (2ID) and the light divisions in Hawaii and Alaska (25ID and 6ID) will not be considered to be available for Europe. One corps headquarters (XVIII), the airborne division (82nd), and the air assault division (101st) will be considered as unavailable to AFCENT although they might be in strategic reserve for SACEUR.

We are now conceivably left with one corps headquarters (I), a motorized division (9th), two light infantry divisions (7ID and 10ID), as well as two mechanized infantry divisions (5ID and 24ID) available to reinforce AFCENT. It is reasonable to assume that the three corps now in place in Europe in our scenario could assume command and control of these divisions when they deploy. Alternatively, the corps headquarters (I) and two or three of these divisions and one or two separate brigades/regiments could be deployed to provide another maneuver corps. Such a corps could be employed in the CENTAG area as an army group reserve.

It is possible to assume that the shipping for the two "heavy" divisions would be available after four days return time from Europe, or M+19 days. Given six days to load, transit, and unload, one division could be available at M+25 days. With two days to move from port to a field location, the division could be ready for employment at M+27 days. Given similar planning factors, the other "heavy" division would be available for employment ten days later, M+37.

At this point we still have four "heavy" National Guard divisions available. These are 35th Infantry Division (Mech), 40th Infantry Division (Mech), 49th Armored Division, and 50th Armored Division. These divisions would need to move by sea. Given our RO/RO ships are available at M+39 days, will the divisions be ready?

Karl H. Lowe states that taking reservists to active duty nominally allows 48 hours from the mobilization decision to notification, with an additional 48 hours to arrive at a mobilization station. He goes on to state, however, that many larger reserve formations could need up to eight weeks of additional training before they would be considered combat ready. 48

Additional impediments to deployment are the lack of aerial port, military air, and sealift resources missing in the active structure and which must be activated from the reserves to support a major overseas deployment. Lack of shipping is also a major factor. The RO/RO type ships necessary to move "heavy" units are very limited in number. The 400 dry-cargo

and passenger ships which NATO has identified are not immediately available and will not help the "heavy" deployment. 49 Further, these ships, as well as U.S. reserve ships, will be needed to move sustainment supplies and logistical units.

Thus, in our "strawman" deployment scenario, forty days into mobilization, M+40, we are ready to move National Guard divisions which may require more training prior to combat. However, given the shortage of RO/RO ships this may not be a major problem. If the first of these four divisions departs on M+40, the earliest that shipping will be available for the second is nine days later, or M+49 days. Using these planning factors, the last division will not reach Europe until M+69 days. If the divisions are employed together as a corps when the last one arrives, sufficient training time should be available either in CONUS or Europe.

In conclusion, our "strawman" deployment scenario may be too optimistic. We will, however, use the time frame of mobilization plus forty-nine to seventy days (M+49 to M+70) as the time frame in which the follow-on forces with which we are concerned, the four "heavy" National Guard divisions, deploy to Europe. The type of command and control headquarters to be employed over these divisions, and when that headquarters should deploy, will be discussed after we review possible missions for these forces in the next section.

MISSIONS FOR FOLLOW-ON DIVISIONS

Any discussion of missions for the follow-on divisions must go beyond a simple listing of offensive, defensive, and other operations. The real concern here is the role of these divisions in the AFCENT commander's campaign plan, or the army group commanders' major operations. In other words, what is the operational impact of these divisions?

In the "strawman" deployment scenario in the previous section, we noted that two active "heavy" divisions could be deployed after the "ten in ten", at M+37 days. These divisions could be assigned either tactical or operational missions.

Possible tactical missions would include assignment to the forward corps in CENTAG (V and VII) as corps reserve. Alternatively, they could be used to replace committed divisions, allowing these to rest and refit in the rear. These are tactical uses which may not have a significant impact on the army group commander's operational plan.

How can these divisions be used operationally? Given that the army group commanders operate at the lower spectrum of the operational level of war, major operations, these divisions must be used in a major operation to obtain operational impact. For example, if the divisions are placed under I Corps (deploying from CONUS) rather than placed under V or VII Corps, one now has a unit capable of use in a major operation. Such an operation could be defensive or offensive. The newly-formed corps might be used to add operational depth to the defense, reduce a penetration, or conduct a counterattack. In roles

such as these, our two divisions begin to assume operational significance.

What about the four "heavy" National Guard divisions which become available at between M+46 and M+69 days? The same tactical and operational questions and missions as addressed above come into play. If these divisions are to have an operational impact they must be utilized as part of a larger unit. The immediate problem with using these divisions as part of a larger unit is lack of a command and control headquarters.

To provide the AFCENT commander with a large unit capable of conducting a major operation, we must establish a command and control headquarters for these divisions. A corps headquarters would seem to be most appropriate as this is the headquarters which provides "the link between the operational and tactical levels of war." 50

In the next section we will look at some historical cases of the employment of corps before we draw conclusions as to the type and number of command and control headquarters needed for U.S. follow-on divisions in AFCENT.

HISTORICAL CASES

Prior to drawing any conclusions and making any recommendations, it may be helpful to review three historical examples of corps headquarters conducting major operations in wartime: II Corps in North Africa in WWII, X Corps in Korea, and Third Army in Northwest Europe in WWII.

II Corps participated in Operation Torch, the 8 November 1942 landings in North Africa. The Commanding General of II Corps, MG Fredendall, served as Commander, Central Task Force, for the invasion. 51 II Corps is of interest because it demonstrates use of a corps headquarters to conduct a major operation.

The chain of command for this operation consisted of three Task Force Commanders: Western (U.S. I Armored Corps), Central (II U.S. Corps), and Eastern (BR. First Army). Along with the Commander, Naval Expeditionary Force, the Task Forces all came directly under the Allied Commander in Chief, General Eisenhower. 52



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Thus we have a case of the Theater Commander, General Eisenhower, utilizing corps to conduct concurrent major operations in a phase of the campaign to capture North Africa. As Theater Commander, General Eisenhower translated strategic guidance from the Combined Chiefs of Staff into an operational campaign plan. The initial phase of this campaign was the execution of the Torch landings, which corps conducted as major operations.

By March 1943, the situation in North Africa had changed. The theater had matured and this required changes in the command structure. Our interest is at the corps level and the relationship of the corps to the operational commander.

In the mature theater, General Eisenhower remained as CINC; however, II Corps was no longer under his direct control. Under the new structure, General Eisenhower directly controlled the Mediterranean Air Command, 18th Army Group, Commander in Chief Mediterranean (Naval Forces), and Fifth Army. 54



Within this organization, II Corps came under command of 18 Army Group along with First (BR) and Eighth (BR) Armies. Therefore, we see an operational level of command, 18 Army Group, inserted between the CINC and II Corps. However, the role of II Corps remained the same; conduct major operations in support of the operational commander's campaign plan. 55



In the example of II Corps, we see operational commanders utilizing a corps headquarters to conduct major operations in support of their campaign plan. The corps headquarters provided the operational commander with flexibility in organizing his forces.

The second example is that of X Corps in the initial phases of the Korean War. I will focus on X Corps' role during the early portion of the war, the period of the Inchon Landing and follow-on operations in North Korea. X Corps is of interest as it demonstrates employment of a corps headquarters to provide command and control for divisions reinforcing the theater of operations.

The Korean War began on 25 June 1950, when the North Korean People's Army conducted a surprise attack on the Republic of Korea (ROK). At the time of the attack, U.S. command structure in the theater consisted of Far Eastern Command (FEC), with General MacArthur as Commander in Chief

(CINCFE). Under his command were all U.S. armed forces in the Western Pacific, with major subordinate commands consisting of Eighth Army, Far East Air Forces (FEAF), and U.S. Naval Forces Far East (NAVFE). 56

At the outbreak of the Korean War, LTG Walton Walker commanded Eighth Army. The army was comprised of four understrength divisions located throughout Japan. 57 It was not until September 1950, however, that Eighth Army organized any corps headquarters. 58

On 26th August 1950, General MacArthur activated Headquarters, X Corps, from the Special Planning Staff (SPS), General Headquarters (GHQ), which had been formed to plan the Inchon landings. All units in the GHQ Reserve were assigned to X Corps to provide the ground forces for the landings at Inchon. MG Edward Almond assumed command of the corps. 59

X Corps participated in both the Inchon and Wonsan landings as a separate command under Far Eastern Command. For the conduct of the actual landings, X Corps was an element of Joint Task Force 7, under command of Admiral Struble. 60



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

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In the case of X Corps, it is rather obvious that the corps conducted major operations within the campaign plan of the theater commander. As in the initial case of II Corps, the theater commander translated strategic guidance into an operational plan and executing the plan in phases through the employment of a corps. The role of the corps remained the same -- conduct major operations.

Finally, we will review the case of Third Army's employment in Northwest Europe in WWII. Third Army provides an excellent example of the establishment of a command and control headquarters for the employment of follow-on forces.

Subsequent to the Normandy Invasion, as the "Cobra" offensive began, U.S. ground forces on the Continent were subordinated to First Army. First Army consisted of four corps with a sum total of fifteen divisions. 63 On 1 August 1944, one week after the start of "Cobra", Third Army was activated under command of 12th Army Group. 12th Army Group also assumed command of First Army at that time. 64 VIII Corps, which was under operational control of First Army, came under

control of Third Army. Additionally, Third Army assumed control of XV and XX Corps on the Continent, as well as XII Corps which was staging from England to the Continent. 65



Third Army's initial mission was to seize the Britanny Peninsula. Britanny was important because of its ports which gave the allies a broad avenue of entry onto the Continent. 66 As the situation changed, Britanny became less important and Third Army's primary mission became an exploitation in a new allied strategy which swung the right flank of the allies east toward Paris. 67.

Third Army provides an example of the advantages of establishing another command and control headquarters for follow-on forces as opposed to placing them under existing headquarters. Third Army provided the operational commander, GEN Bradley, with a subordinate headquarters capable of conducting a major operation, while concurrently providing the flexibility to rapidly change lines of operation.

These historical cases have provided examples of the role of corps and army headquarters in conducting major operations in support of the operational commander's campaign plan. The flexibility which the operational commander receives by having an additional command and control headquarters for his follow-

on forces is evident. Important insights into the role of command and control headquarters for follow-on divisions to AFCENT can be gained by looking to the past. In the next section, I will draw some conclusions and make recommendations for today's situation.

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

The AFCENT and army group commanders operate at the operational level of war. The AFCENT commander operates at the upper level, operational art, translating strategic guidance into operational objectives through campaign plans. The army group commanders operate at the lower level, conducting major operations as part of the AFCENT commander's campaign. Corps provide the interface between operations and tactics.

A deficiency exists in the command and control of follow-on U.S. divisions to AFCENT. This deficiency is at the level which provides the interface between the tactical and operational headquarters, the corps. This failure to provide a linkage between the divisions and the army group limits the campaign planning of the AFCENT commander, as well as the ability to conduct major operations.

Lack of command and control headquarters for the follow-on divisions could be resolved in part by deployment of a CONUS-based corps headquarters (I) to Europe after the "ten in ten" rapid reinforcement, but prior to the deployment of the remaining two "heavy" active divisions.

Such a deployment would occur at approximately mobilization plus twenty days. Since both divisions would not close until plus thirty-seven days, this would provide the corps time to both plan and organize sustainment and combat support/combat service support (CS/CSS) assets. This scenario also presupposes the concurrent movement of CS/CSS units with the deploying divisions.

A similar operational/tactical employment case can be made for the four "heavy" National Guard divisions. In this case, however, there is not an available corps headquarters. Such a headquarters would have to be "created", perhaps from the personnel of one of the numbered CONUS-based armies.

Providing two additional corps headquarters for command and control of follow-on divisions to AFCENT would also increase the "depth" of corps headquarters available in Europe. The AFCENT and army group commanders would gain some flexibility if a forward headquarters was destroyed or degraded. Additionally, divisions could be rotated between forward and reserve corps to reconstitute or rest and refit.

At least one question which must be answered is that of support and sustainment. Do sufficient CS/CSS assets exist to support two additional corps in Europe? This would need to be determined; however, two Corps Support Commands, the 103rd and the 311th, do exist in the reserve structure. 68

A final conclusion: attempting to determine the requirement for command and control headquarters based on the availability of divisions is the wrong approach. A better approach would be for the AFCENT commander to develop his campaign plan and based on this, determine the requirements of the army group commanders to conduct the major operations of the campaign by phase. This would allow a more rational approach to determining the preferred deployment sequence of forces to Europe, as well as the required number of corps headquarters.

The United States must press NATO commanders to conduct campaign planning in order to provide a basis for force structure and deployment planning. This is a primary requirement if NATO is to win at the operational level of war.

The U.S. Army should review the requirement for corps headquarters in AFCENT and, at the minimum, add one for use in the CENTAG area. Consideration should be given to deploying such a headquarters soon after the "ten in ten" rapid reinforcement forces. Additionally, the feasibility of a small, permanently deployed "Corps Forward" planning cell should be considered. Such a unit could be modeled on the current III Corps (FWD) which is deployed in the Netherlands.

A study should be made of the necessity and feasibility of creating a second deploying corps headquarters for command and control of late-deploying Reserve and National Guard forces. Rather than creating such a corps in the active or reserve structure, we should look at the possibility of "dual-hatting" a numbered army commander in CONUS. Such an organization could establish a forward planning cell as previously described and be established from existing assets upon mobilization.

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